The phrase “war never changes” holds truth and inconsistency. Overall, yes, the concept of war remains the same in that it involves the use of mass conflict to achieve a preset goal. But when Russian forces occupied the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on 4 March 2022, it marked the first time in history that such a facility was situated in an active combat zone. At that moment, war changed.
The war against Ukraine might seem like an obvious choice for political discussion and how its diplomatic and socioeconomic fallout will have impacts long after its end. However, a lesser, more niche realm of international relations will be shaped in the coming decade because of the ongoing conflict: global nuclear policy during a time of war. In this article, I will analyse how the current occupation of ZNPP, combined with previous nuclear incidents, has exposed an unforeseen gap in nuclear security protocol that will likely impact its future development.
ZNPP, a Ukrainian power station that previously provided 27% of the country‘s energy, has been under Russian military control for over two years. As the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, this marks the first time in history that such a facility sits in the middle of an active warzone. All six reactors in the plant are now in cold shutdown, meaning that while there is now a greater security buffer in case of a direct attack, the plant does not generate any power for district heating or the country’s power grid. However, the facility still contains a significant amount of spent radioactive material — around 13.000 spent fuel rods — that, if damaged during an attack, could cause a radiological emergency with greater consequences than Chernobyl. The threat of a nuclear accident does not present a novel idea, but the management of a nuclear power plant by a foreign military presents a situation that no emergency protocols were designed to handle.
Global Response to Nuclear Incidents
While this crisis is unprecedented, history reveals a clear pattern in how the world responds to nuclear reactor incidents. The partial reactor meltdown that led to the release of a minor amount of radioactive gas at Three Mile Island prompted the United States’ creation of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. The tragic and deadly accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant set into motion, albeit years later, the creation of multiple international nuclear safety conventions and sets of safety standards established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Japan’s meltdown of two reactors at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power station following a tsunami led to the IAEA’s intervention once again with multiple response actions, including the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, multiple proceedings of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and a task force designated to monitor the decades-long decommissioning of the plant.
While this crisis is unprecedented, history reveals a clear pattern in how the world responds to nuclear reactor incidents.
Future Implications in Nuclear Security Policy
Regarding ZNPP’s impact on future nuclear policy, there are two realms in which the effects might be seen: the established additions to nuclear security policy that have already been implemented, and the speculation of whether or not another nuclear power plant could become militarised in a future conflict, requiring the same type of safety standards created for Ukraine. It should be clarified that the terms ‘nuclear safety’ and ‘nuclear security’ are not necessarily interchangeable; safety addresses the prevention of nuclear accidents at power plants, while security prevents the misuse of materials for unregulated activity (for example, creating an atomic weapon). ZNPP’s occupation challenges both of these areas. Some effects can already be observed through the IAEA’s establishment of the seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict. These pillars, supported by an additional five principles specific to ZNPP, could be used as a baseline for defining future safety standards in the case of another similar situation.
Additionally, a task force of IAEA experts stationed permanently at ZNPP has been created to ensure compliance with these pillars — which could serve as an example of how future task forces could operate. While formerly implemented standards for nuclear safety include guidelines for emergency preparedness, armed conflict has not been accounted for on the potential list of casualties. Because of the occupation of ZNPP, armed conflict might be added to the list of possible emergencies that a nuclear power plant must be trained to deal with. The creation of designated task forces for nuclear power plants would be an unprecedented addition to nuclear security guidelines, and it is an unfortunate possibility that facilities might need to be prepared for such a situation. Regardless, the Russia-Ukraine war has demonstrated that it is not out of the question.
Further speculation questions whether an entirely new treaty or set of Safety Standards might be developed to outline the conditions upheld at a plant during a time of war, based on the IAEA’s actions and trials learned from the ongoing occupation. Nuclear installation policies might be adapted to require higher-integrity construction for facilities at plants built in areas that are more prone to conflict, similar to the requirements for plants in natural disaster-prone areas. Such policies designed to be implemented during a time of war would be a first amongst the hundreds of nuclear safety and security treaties designed in the decades since the conception of nuclear power and its potential.
The adaptation of nuclear safety policies for armed conflicts are not influential differences that are felt, discussed, or even made aware to the general public — but this does not undermine the global impact that these changes would have on the dynamics of nuclear policy development. To prevent future catastrophes, international nuclear policymakers must take into consideration the integration of conflict-specific safety and security protocols. The creation of future nuclear power plants should not have to be planned with the possibility of their weaponisation in mind. Only through the evolution of policymaking can the world ensure that its nuclear infrastructure remains resilient for future generations of clean energy.
