The Far East has always echoed a certain level of political uncertainty in its relations with the Western world. However, with the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, regional affairs in Northeastern Asia appear more questionable than ever, especially since North Korea has decided to join Russia’s quest for power politics in Eastern Europe. Much to the dismay of the international community, Mongolia decided to add a geopolitical plot twist of its own by hosting the recent visit of President Vladimir Putin in early September 2024. This noteworthy moment can be argued as a political statement of a rebel country that prefers to focus on its national interest rather than abide by the rules and procedures of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
By disregarding the international obligation to arrest Putin during his official visit to the capital Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia indirectly demonstrated how little importance it places on ICC membership and legal obligations in a world torn by armed conflicts and diplomatic tensions. This lack of cooperation may, in fact, reveal a broader sentiment within the non-liberal world; slowly but steadily, several countries are beginning to question the values of liberal democracy, opting instead to align with dissident powers such as Russia.
In this case, we must ask ourselves the following questions: where did our democratic international community go wrong, and why is political liberalism gradually losing its global credibility?
While we are still inclined to view the fall of the Soviet Union as a positive turning point in the history of democracy, the saying “old habits die hard” holds particularly true in the shadowy post-Soviet space, where the Russian sphere of influence remains as strong as ever. Though Mongolia has been a member of the ICC for over two decades, its internal politics play a much greater role in shaping national interests and international conduct. Moreover, neighbouring Russia still remains a key influence on Mongolian politics – a factor frequently overlooked by the West in its sporadic interactions with Northeast Asia.
An additional significant element of this cooperation is the annual Russian-Mongolian military exercises. They involve joint military training in Choibalsan where Mongolia has hosted Russian military personnel since 2008. Shortly before President Putin’s official meeting with his Mongolian counterpart Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh, the Choibalsan training camp prepared for joint military drills involving approximately 700 Russian servicemen and over 200 pieces of Russian military equipment to simulate a cooperative action group. Geopolitically, this collaboration reinforces Mongolia’s historical alignment with Russia, rooted in their shared legacy as former members of the Soviet Union and a once-unified military structure.
Yet again, Ulaanbaatar prioritises Mongolian interests in regional affairs, favouring Moscow’s guidance over Western plans and ideals. Mongolia’s focus on geopolitical practicality appears to reflect its strong desire for tangible support rather than abstract promises. This approach may ensure a clearer and more stable outcome for its nation’s welfare, specifically in the event of a regional conflict, where Russian assistance could, in fact, make the difference. To put it short, Ulaanbaatar has little motivation to uphold international obligations that fail to deliver direct benefits, especially in times of global political and economic uncertainty. The future of Northeastern Asia is unpredictable, raising multiple questions of realism for the democratic world. As the Ukrainian crisis continues to destabilise Eastern Europe, the West must be prepared for a lingering period of chaos in the Far East. Multipolarity is gradually becoming the norm on the international scene, where unconventional actors such as Russia and China have already succeeded in attracting new allies, whether through the expanding BRICS organisation or the much debated Eurasian Union.
However, as a general principle, political preferences in interstate relations are also shaped by economic concerns. For instance, a Mongolian government official recently explained his country’s decision to welcome President Putin as a measure aimed at ensuring the “survival” of its people, considering Mongolia’s dependency on Russian energy. Another reason for Ulaanbaatar’s openness to Russia is the Central Corridor project – a key national objective that could bring significant economic benefits to the region. More precisely, this has been outlined as a trilateral collaboration among Russia, China, and Mongolia, which is primarily meant to increase regional trade and link the Northeast (including North Korea) with Central Asia, hence requiring substantial investments to renew and expand Mongolian transport infrastructure.
For the first time in post-Soviet history, Mongolia has a fully active role in regional affairs, guided by Russia and its ambitions of creating a stronger sphere of influence and antagonising the Western democratic world. Though some might disagree, Vladimir Putin’s visit in the Mongolian capital represents a powerful political assertion that unfortunately proves the ineffectiveness of international sanctions, as well as the unsurprisingly volatile nature of geopolitics in the Far East.
The hard truth is countries with an intense totalitarian past will never be able to completely overcome their tendency to gravitate toward similar nearby powers. The Russian- Mongolian friendship seems to outweigh Ulaanbaatar’s neutral “Third Neighbor Policy,” which was oftentimes wrongly interpreted as an upfront alignment with the Western international order. By adding China to this unsolved geopolitical equation, it is quite clear that Mongolia’s foreign policy will always be influenced by its Soviet past and Beijing’s political visions, which, most of the time, align with Russia’s.
IN THIS RATHER RISKY EQUILIBRIUM, MONGOLIA IS CONFRONTED WITH THE DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY WHILE ALSO INTERACTING POLITICALLY, MILITARILY AND ECONOMICALLY WITH ITS NEIGHBOURING GREAT POWERS.
At the present moment, the future of democracy in Northeast Asia hangs in a precarious balance, as both Russia and China exert a certain degree of power over the smaller players or lonesome rebels that are no longer in sync with Western ideals. Like North Korea, Mongolia prefers to primarily focus on its national interest by improving its brittle economy through joint ventures with its powerful neighbours and by strengthening diplomatic ties that have the potential to bring more than mere promises.
In this rather risky equilibrium, Mongolia is confronted with the difficult problem of maintaining national sovereignty while also interacting politically, militarily and economically with its neighbouring great powers. In spite of the fact that projects such as the Central Corridor plan validate Ulaanbaatar’s efforts to broaden its trade lines and diversify its relationships in Eurasia, they also emphasise national dependence on Moscow and Beijing.
All in all, Mongolia’s political path is not much within the control of the liberal international community. Though its decisions might not directly affect Europe or North America, they simply prove one key aspect: post-Soviet democracies remain vulnerable in the face of unpredictable regional geopolitics. In this case, patience and open diplomatic channels may be the best strategy that the Western liberal world could adopt. Any attempts to forcefully modify Mongolia’s political orientation through coercion or sanctions are unlikely to have favourable effects. For the moment, as well as for the near future, diplomatic openness, international trade and cultural exchanges remain the only positive solutions.
